Displacements of Memory::Struggles Against the Erosion and Dislocation of the Material Record of Violence in Burundi by Purdekova, Andrea
        
Citation for published version:
Purdekova, A 2017, 'Displacements of Memory: Struggles Against the Erosion and Dislocation of the Material
Record of Violence in Burundi', International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 339-358.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijx012
DOI:
10.1093/ijtj/ijx012
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in International Journal
of Transitional Justice following peer review. The version of record, Purdekova, A. (2017). Displacements of
Memory: Struggles Against the Erosion and Dislocation of the Material Record of Violence in Burundi.
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 11(2), 339-358,  is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijx012
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. May. 2019
 1 
Displacements of Memory:  
Struggles Against the Erosion and Dislocation of the Material Record of 
Violence in Burundi 
Andrea Purdeková 
 
Abstract. The paper investigates unofficial commemoration practices, interaction with 
sites of memory and the fate of materiality of memory – mass gravesites and their 
remains— in the context of Burundi’s stalled transitional justice process. The focus lies 
on post-war spaces where material remnants of a violent past struggle against new layers 
of developmental, infrastructural build-up and political disincentive. The paper explores 
three concrete sites of violence in Burundi as these confront different forms of erasure 
and displacement of memory ranging from physical removal, misplacement of remains to 
symbolic delinkage. In the process, the paper revisits notions of the public secret, the 
labor of the negative and truth as revelation. The paper closes with reflections on the 
latest developments and concretely whether the establishment in 2014 of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission spells a decisive break with the past. 
Key words: commemoration, sites of violence, exhumation, transitional justice, Burundi 
 
Introduction: Commemoration in Transition? 
“Truth is not a matter of exposure of the secret, but a revelation that does justice to it.” 
- Walter Benjamin 
Much has been written about contexts where transitional justice processes and 
commemoration are ongoing, and about the nature and politics of memory unfolding 
therein. The current paper instead investigates unofficial commemoration practices, 
interaction with sites of memory and the fate of materiality of memory—mass grave 
sites and their remains— in the absence of a functioning, official transitional justice 
mechanism. The paper takes as its case study Burundi, a country with one of the longest-
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running public silences on a violent past.1 The central query of the paper is as follows: 
How has the politics of silence on the past translated into space, shaping the physical 
record of violence, and how has it transformed over time, especially in the post-war 
period characterized neither by open suppression nor overt action on the past? 
 
Uniquely, the paper approaches its topic through the lens of materiality of memory. 
There is a profound gap in the literature on this topic with existing transitional justice 
debates revolving predominantly around public preferences for justice versus 
forgiveness and silence on the past, or alternatively local conflict resolution 
mechanisms.2 Yet materiality can provide not only a fresh but also an extremely useful 
perspective on the ways in which memory, commemoration and power interlock after 
war. Within this broader nexus, the paper specifically explores the local post-war 
struggles against the erasure and displacement of memory as reflected in the ways in 
which the material remnants of a violent past struggle against new layers of 
developmental, infrastructural build-up and political disincentive. While such practices 
of obliteration-through-development have been documented through human reports in 
many regions including Latin America, Asia and Africa, there is a striking absence of 
academic analysis..  
 
The story of transitional justice in Burundi is one of absence before and during the civil 
war, and one of a political deadlock thereafter. After the war, active suppression of 
memory has given in to an ostensibly supported but politically fraught and stalled 
                                                        
1 The public inaction and silence in Burundi is a notably prolonged one, spanning more than five 
decades of political violence from independence in 1962 to much after the end of the civil war 
(1993-2003), we could argue up till today.  
2 See Cyrus Samii, ‘Who Wants to Forgive and Forget? Transitional Justice Preferences in Post-
War Burundi,’ Journal of Peace Research 50, 2 (2009):219-233; Bert Ingelaere, ‘Living Together 
Again. The Expectations of Transitional Justice in Burundi- A View From Below,’ IOB Working 
Paper (2009); Peter Uvin and Ann Nee, ‘Justice, Silence and Social Capital’, 145-171 in Peter Uvin, 
Ed, Life After Violence: A Peoples’ Story of Burundi, (New York: Zed Books, 2009); Bert Ingelaere 
and Dominik Kohlhagen (2012) ‘Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The 
Bushingantahe in Burundi,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, 1 (2012):40-59.  
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process of transitional justice.3 What has emerged is a ‘good enough peace’ coupled with 
a ‘rhetorical adherence to a global transitional justice paradigm’.4 The deadlock on the 
past has to do with the careful power sharing between elites all of whom are implicated 
in the past of violence.5  
 
The political deadlock has translated into the sphere of public commemoration as well. 
Burundi remains outside the ‘global rush to commemorate atrocities,’6 the ‘flourishing 
“monument phenomenon.”’7 The study here thus bypasses the burgeoning literature on 
the politics of museums, memorial and public statuary, and the controversies over 
memory where commemoration has been launched after war and genocide.8 The 
situation in Burundi contrasts starkly with neighboring Rwanda for example where the 
government has erected didactic memorials of the jenoside, and where the landscape is 
dotted with memorials and the year with commemorative events.9  
 
                                                        
3 The basis of the transitional justice mechanisms has been laid in the 2000 Arusha Accord. But 
because key negotiations with belligerents continued after this date (2003 and 2009), 
implementation was postponed and subject to political negotiations. National Consultations 
finally took place in 2009, and a draft law on a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was 
prepared and went through various transformations in 2011 and 2012. Finally, in 2014, the law 
was passed and the Commission established. 
4 Vandeginste (2016:4&9). 
5 The 1972 Hutu genocide perpetrated by the UPRONA government was later accompanied by 
massacres perpetrated by all factions to the 1993-2003 civil war.  
6 Paul Williams, Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities, (Oxford: Berg, 
2007). 
7 Sabine Marchall, Landscape of Memory. Commemorative monuments, memorials and public 
statuary in post-apartheid South-Africa, (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
8 See Elisabeth King, ‘Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for 
Peacebuilding,’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 3,6 (2010); Rachel Ibreck, ‘The politics of 
mourning: Survivor contributions to memorials in post-genocide Rwanda,’ Memory Studies 3,4 
(2010); Shannon Davis and Jacky Bowring, ‘Connecting with Tragedy Through Landscapes of 
Memory: Memorial Design, Tourism, and the Post-Genocide Memoryscapes of Cambodia, 
Rwanda, and Germany,’ Memory Connection 1,1 (2011) 
9 This is not to mean that silence and invisibility are not present in Rwanda. The multiple Tutsi 
remains on display contrast with the hidden and buried, unmarked and unrecognized remains of 
Hutu victims of violence during the 1990-1994 civil war and after.  
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On the other hand, Burundi’s story is not quite one of ‘absent monuments’10 either and 
the paper takes care in comparing sites of violence that differ markedly in terms of 
demarcation and commemoration. In other words, there are levels to silence and 
recognition, amount of commemorative practice or resistance in Burundi today and in 
the past. To foreground this gradation, and using Kenneth Foote’s typology,11 the paper 
will consider a ‘designated’ site (clearly marked as a space of memory) under direct 
threat of obliteration from above, a ‘rectified’ site (one returned to its prior use without 
sign or ceremony) demanding designation from below, and an ‘obliterated’ site, the 
result of indirect effacement, never marked and now to be turned into private use. 
Despite the differences, the paper will demonstrate and explain how in all three spaces 
memory is under threat of suppression. As will be shown, after the war people struggle 
against a more multifaceted and ambiguous attack on the past, glanced here through the 
dislodging of the material indexes of violence – memorials, memorial graveyards and 
victims’ remains.  
 
To structure its analysis, the paper deploys and revisits the notions of the public secret, 
the labor of the negative and truth as revelation. In his book Defacement, 12 and based on 
long-term research among Colombian communities affected by violence, Michael 
Taussig offers us incisive analytical tools with which to trace the workings of memory 
suppression in contexts such as Burundi.13  For Taussig, whose definitions serve here as 
starting points, public secret and the labor of the negative refer to ‘negative knowledge’ 
or to the practice of ‘knowing what not to know.’ Public secret is that which is ‘generally 
                                                        
10 Laleh Khalili, ‘Absent Monuments and Appropriated Memory Spaces: Palestinian 
Commemorative Spaces in Lebanon,’ (2004), 
http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/historymatters/papers/LalehKhalili.pdf?referer=www.clickfin
d.com.au 
11 See Kenneth E. Foote, Shadowed Ground: America's Landscapes of Violence and Tragedy, 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,2003).  
12 See Michael Taussig, Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999). 
13 Ibid. 
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known but cannot be articulated.’14 Reversing the Foucauldian accent on knowledge as 
power, Taussig brings our attention to power through public oblivion or disarticulation. 
 
But we need to push Taussig further. If in its broadest sense ‘labor of the negative’ 
points to effacement of memory, then we must acknowledge there are modulations in its 
form. While ‘knowing what not to know’ was indeed key to power of Burundi’s regimes 
prior to the end of the war and the dominant form of memory erosion, the labor of 
effacing the past has transformed and diversified so that there are multiple labors of 
negative at play today and these do not necessarily depend on negative knowledge. 
From dense suppression of the past under the one-party ethnocracy, erosion of memory 
proceeds under an ostensible political consent to a process of public retrieval and 
recognition. The past is instead threatened by the lack of its de facto protection and 
articulation.  In the post-war period, the labor of the negative thus manifests in more 
subtle forms that have to do with physical and symbolic (dis)placement of remains and 
indirect obliteration. But do such forms cease to produce power as the ability to proceed 
‘as if not’ and the desired state of impunity? 
 
To demonstrate the changing nature of the labors of the negative, the paper traces three 
sites as these confront different forms of memory erosion ranging from physical 
disposal of remains (at hill Zege), misplacement of remains (at Kivyuka), to symbolic 
delinkage (at Bugendana).. Importantly, in none of these cases is public secret the main 
motor of memory’s erosion. In neither case do power and meaning reside in the act and 
fact of public exposure. Rather than simply seeing, showing, knowing, what matters 
from a local perspective is representing and acknowledging in particular forms and 
spaces. Thus if there is one running line throughout the paper, it must be Walter 
                                                        
14 Ibid., 5. 
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Benjamin’s observation that truth is not a ‘matter of exposure of the secret, but a 
revelation that does justice to it.’15  
 
The methodology underlying this paper is qualitative and grounded in the perspectives 
of ordinary Burundians. The fieldwork for this research was conducted between 2013 
and 2015 in the provinces of Gitega, Bubanza and Bujumbura. The methodology is 
qualitative and ethnographic and combines a number of data-gathering techniques. In 
addition to semi-structured interviews with rural Burundians and civil society 
representatives, the research also draws and informal exchanges and observation in all 
sites and memorials discussed, as well as primary and secondary materials. The longer-
term scope of the project allowed for repeated visits to a number of sites and follow-up 
interviews with some of the key participants. 
 
Histories of silence and informal commemoration 
The memory-scape in Burundi has been ‘a politicized milieu’ throughout its history.16 
Across more than five decades and despite the war’s end, a structure of silence and 
impunity has continued to undermine a public project of commemoration. As a result, 
commemorative initiatives have been privatized, informal and hidden. Despite this 
broad continuity, we can distinguish between four distinct phases of memory practice 
during Burundi’s independent period. The first phase, just after independence in the 
1960s, saw construction of monuments to heroes and dignitaries as was common 
elsewhere in the early nation-building period. Even during this time, politically 
motivated killings were present, though these were not discussed in public. There were 
no major civilian casualties.   
 
                                                        
15 quoted in Taussig, supra n 3 at 8. 
16 See Aloys Batungwanayo and Benjamin Vanderlick, ‘Lieux de Mémoire: Commemorative 
Initiatives and Memorials to Burundi’s Conflicts: Invisible and Permanent Memories,’ Impunity 
Watch (2012). 
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The situation changed dramatically in the 1970s. A short-lived Hutu rebellion in 1972 
brought on a brutal repression by the state against all educated Hutu, classed by 
Lemarchand as a ‘selective genocide.’17 The mass casualties were hidden from view, the 
bodies disappeared and dumped into mass graves. The victims of the violence were 
officially labeled enemies of the state (abamenja). A complete public silence on the 
events was imposed: ‘The Micombero regime, together with its administrative cadres, 
police and informers, watched this carefully. One ambiguous word, even a veiled 
criticism, could result in summons to the authorities, a fine, imprisonment without 
charge or worse, a disappearance’.18 The imprudences de langage (careless expression) 
came at a cost. In line with the code of silence, commemoration was forbidden. ‘After 
1972, families were forbidden to mourn, to organize their traditional rites (imigirwa), 
the mourning and close of mourning ceremonies (kugandara and kuganduka).’19  
 
Importantly, even in this climate of suppression during the 1970s, commemoration did 
not disappear but was performed privately and unofficially. But it was only decades 
later that the Hutu began ‘testing the limits of the possible’ in the public sphere.20 The 
reportoire included ‘the shaving of heads to commemorate the 1972 carnage, peaceful 
demonstrations and not-so-peaceful private altercations.’21 A large demonstration was 
organized in 1991 in the province of Cibitoke to commemorate the 1972 victims. ‘What 
is significant about this public display of solidarity is that it happened at all. …This was 
the first time in 25 years that Barundi, most of them peasants, were able to peacefully 
                                                        
 17 René Lemarchand and David Martin, Selective Genocide in Burundi (London: Minority Rights, 
1974); René Lemarchand, ‘Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?’ 
African Studies Review 41, 1 (1998). 
18 Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Jean-Francois Dupaquier, Burundi 1972, Au bord des génocides (Paris: 
Karthala,2007),465. 
19 Interview with Thacien Keshimana at CENAP, July 11, 2013.  
20 Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. New ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1996),148. 
21 Ibid.,147. 
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express demands, which the authorities had previously silenced.’22 This was nonetheless 
a very narrow window of opening. The demonstration happened shortly before the civil 
war would erode such spaces of possibility. 
 
During this period, memory work was also very much alive and intensified in the space 
of exile where it was freed from the constraints of a repressive regime.23 Tanzanian 
refugee camps where Hutu survivors gathered in hundreds of thousands were especially 
intense in reflection and in production of a Hutu political consciousness, historicity and 
historical narratives. 
 
The third phase of memory practice started in the 1990s during the civil war (1993-
2003), which of course produced its own landscape of violence. During this period, 
commemorative initiatives were selectively ‘approved by successive governments, who 
demonstrated great propensity for memorialisation when their own responsibility was 
not engaged.’24 These initiatives were nonetheless few and far between. A clear political 
motivation and ethnic profiling defined the few memory ‘markers’ that appeared. While 
Tutsi victims of massacres such as that in Bugendana could be memorialized, Hutu 
victims of government massacres such as those in Kivyuka were not.  
 
Over time then, there was a gradual shift from ‘celebrating “great men” to 
commemoration of civilian casualties’ but the latter tendency was politically inflected, 
partial, and minimal in scope.25 The civil war has also created a competitive victimhood 
model, and what Lemarchand deplored as ‘ethnicised memory.’26  In line with this, the 
                                                        
22 Ibid.,150. 
23 See Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu 
Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,1995). 
24 Vanderlick and Batungwanayo, supra n 22 at 27. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Rene Lemarchand, ‘Le génocide de 1972 au Burundi: les silences de l’histoire,’ Cahiers d'études 
africaines 42, 167 (2002):551-67. 
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war period saw the construction of ‘monument-cemeteries restricted to one massacre 
and one ethnic group.’27 It still remains difficult to unwork this legacy despite recent 
attempts at creating cross-victim association platforms such as CARAVI. 
 
The last phase of memory practice can be dated to the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement, 
which has made a number of provisions for transitional justice28 and a few on 
commemoration more specifically.29 But the progress has been stalled and politicized. 
Justice mechanisms have been completely sidelined, and a widely criticized TRC draft 
law was only passed in 2014. The new TRC was finally established just ahead of the 
controversial 2015 elections and the last section will critically question whether this 
event spells a major shift in the dynamics observed in this paper.  
 
The post-war prevarication from above has been met with a greater push from below. 
But the work of local associations has been directly frustrated by the government. 
Ceremonies have been subject to government authorization and rarely granted. The 
government has systematically denied requests for registration of associations, for 
exhumations and ‘end of mourning’ ceremonies. The public silence on the past has thus 
continued, despite an overt change of course and a rhetorical commitment to a truth and 
reconciliation process.  
 
To this day then there has been no proper reckoning with decades of a violent past, and 
the challenges here are hard to overstate. The 1972 genocide and the decade-long civil 
war have produced a massive material record of private pain and public oblivion. 
Civilians were targeted by all belligerent parties and most areas of Burundi were 
                                                        
27 Vanderlick and Batungwanayo, supra n 23 at 30. 
28 Specifically, Chapter II calls for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Article 8) and a Judicial Commission of Inquiry (Article 18). The full text is available here: 
https://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/No%201%20arusha.pdf 
29 Article 6 of the Accord for example calls for the erection of a national monument in memory of 
all victims of the genocide.  
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affected by guerrilla-instigated or counter-insurgency violence. As a result, around half a 
million victims and hundreds of sites of violence are yet to receive any form of 
meaningful redress and recognition. 
 
Displacements of Memory: Contested Sites and the Clash of Materialities 
 
How have people been marking and commemorating atrocity in the absence of a public 
process and how successful have they been in counter-acting the forces of suppression 
or erasure? How does negation of memory proceed in the new circumstances of a post-
war state hovering in the twilight zone of outward commitment coupled with lack of 
meaningful action? Analysis of concrete sites and remains of violence is a useful way of 
tackling these questions. The current paper explores three such sites, each with a 
different history and politics surrounding commemoration. As will be shown, though all 
three sites face either clearance or displacement of ‘what remains,’ in each case the 
labor of the negative proceeds in a slightly different way. We will see actual physical 
effacement (the case of Zege), threatened symbolic erasure through delinkage 
(Bugendana) and exposure without recognition, a limbo of memory (Kivyuka). The 
victims and their representatives have been resisting such moves, with different degrees 
of involvement and success.  
 
In a country populated by hundreds of mass graves, why have these three been chosen? 
The cases presented here are both representative of wider dynamics in Burundi and 
capture the variation within a theme, the many faces of a single dynamic. In other words, 
there are ‘myriad similar events’ to those studied here whereby ‘the experience of 
violence and its enduring aftermath are broadly shared by many other communities.’30 
                                                        
30 David Taylor, ‘Under the Avocado Trees. Local Needs and Burundi’s TRC: Whither the Truth?,’ 
The Journal of Eastern African Studies 7, 3 (2013), p.451 
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But there are also fine nuances in this broader dynamic and it is the aim of the article to 
capture this. 
 
All three sites contain the violent remains of a particular period— the civil war. This is 
because the earlier phase of violence in 1972 was quite distinct— people were removed 
from their home localities and disappeared, buried in a small number of mass graves. 
The civil war on the other hand was the epoch that really proliferated sites of killing, 
both because of its protracted nature and the nature of the violence (insurgency and 
counter-insurgency tactics spanning Burundi and both targeting civilians). The sites 
were local, opening histories of both suppression and informal interaction, which are of 
interest here. 
 
a. The Spectre of Displacement: Plans for Airport Construction over Bugendana 
IDP site, Gitega. 
 
The Bugendana IDP site-turned informal settlement dates back to the start of the 
Burundian civil war in 1993. It lies in central Burundi, an hour’s drive from the city of 
Gitega and has approximately a thousand inhabitants, the vast majority of whom are 
Tutsi. The inhabitants are refusing to leave the site despite the sustained pressures from 
the government to remove them.  
 
The site is unique in a number of ways. First, it is not only a site of those ‘chased’ from 
their hills during the violence of the early 1990s, targeting specifically the Tutsi in 
retaliation for the killing of the first Hutu democratically-elected President in 1993. A 
massacre also happened directly on the site in July 1996, which claimed the lives of 
between 300-600 IDPs. People vividly recall the details of the massacre. At daybreak, an 
ibitero (an attack group) of about a thousand Hutu men attacked the IDP camp from 
different directions. The attackers were commanded by the CNDD-FDD rebel group, one 
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of the key Hutu militias fighting the government at the time, and now the dominant 
party in power. The dozen militaries guarding the camp were easily defeated, and the 
ibitero went on a killing rampage across the site. 
 
As a result of these dramatic events, the Bugendana space exudes a power rarely 
observed elsewhere. The past has a very strong affective presence in the lives of its 
inhabitants and comes pouring in from their accounts with urgency and immediacy of a 
lived present. The materiality of the site itself aids in this process. The informal 
settlement spreads around a cemetery and monument for the victims— a large wooden 
cross with a memorial inscription. Herein then lies the second point of uniqueness— in 
contrast to most other sites of violence in Burundi, Bugendana’s massacre has been 
marked and commemorated, with annual commemorations taking place since the 
violent events of 1996.  
 
The ability to kindle, preserve and inscribe memory into space in Bugendana can be 
explained by the politics of the time. Bugendana’s were Tutsi victims at the time when 
Tutsi were in power. The ability to commemorate was of course partial. As shown in the 
next section, all but silence has dominated the space of another massacre perpetrated 
around the same time and of the same magnitude, though this time at the hands of the 
government. Bugendana nonetheless saw a reversal of fates after the war when the 
embattled Tutsi-led government entered into a complex power-sharing agreement with 
Hutu groups and other small Tutsi parties. The perpetrators of the massacre were now 
in power, achieving ever increasing political dominance over time.31 This then marks 
another point of uniqueness of the Bugendana site—those in power see the site and the 
memorial as an undesirable reminder, an index of their own imbrication in violence.  
                                                        
31 Stef Vandeginste, ‘Power-sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The 
Costs and Benefits of Burundi's 2010 Elections’, Journal of Modern African Studies 49, 2 
(2011):315-335. 
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During my first visit in 2013, I wanted to gather the inhabitants’ perspectives on 
transitional justice. Nonetheless, people seemed thoroughly consumed with another 
matter— the alleged pressures they faced to disperse from the site and the threats made 
by the government to clear the location, including the cemetery and the memorial. The 
dispersal was to be undertaken in the name of development of the area— the 
construction of a local airport. In a stark contrast to the case of Kivyuka (discussed next) 
where human remains were ‘accidentally’ unearthed during construction work, in 
Bugendana infrastructural development directly threatened to displace both people and 
memory by delinking them from place.  
 
The labor of the negative thus proceeded differently in Bugendana than in the two other 
cases where actual physical delinkage and displacement has already occurred. People in 
Bugendana were haunted by the spectre and intimations of removal. Interviewee after 
interviewee impressed on me their unwillingness to be moved from the site and return 
‘home’ to their hills of origin. In a situation where perpetrators went unpunished, the 
inhabitants felt their security was in danger. The threats and rumors of removal created 
a powerful state of anxiety and insecurity on the site, resurrecting the traumas of the 
past. The threats of re-development thus exacted their own form of violence. The labor 
of the negative showed the extent of its potency – much before being executed, and 
whether or not executed in the final moment, it was already productive in the present. 
 
The fate of the cemetery was of key concern, besides the issue of security in spaces of 
return on the hills. ‘Before they remove us, they have to show us where they take ours 
(the buried victims of the massacre). Because if the cemetery stays here, it is a way to 
destroy evidence of what they did. We won’t leave until they show us where they are 
taking ours. ’ A local administrator outside the settlement confirmed the re-
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development plan.32 Despite his admission that one of the reasons people want to stay at 
the site is to ‘be close to those they lost in the massacre’, he said the removal should not 
be a problem since it is lawful ‘to move cemeteries.’ A process of delinkage was at play. 
 
When I came back in April 2015, the Bugendana site and its inhabitants were still there, 
but so were the lingering fears of displacement and the talk of the airport. The word had 
it that abazungu (white people) came in February 2015 to assess the area for 
construction. Others said that the CNDD-FDD held a meeting in the commune recently 
where ‘they told the population [their supporters] that if they elected them in 2015, this 
project of the airport would be concretized.’ Another man recounted the same: ‘They 
told the population this Sunday that this airport they have been waiting so long for is 
coming now, they can testify.’ And yet, whether the airport plans were mere threats, or 
whether these were real plans that might indeed materialize, they were already 
productive in their mere potentiality. ‘This idea of airport’ made people feel ‘powerless’ 
and ‘afraid,’ a young man explained.  
 
The threats of re-development and (re)displacement produced a dense transcript of 
mistrust towards the state and its motives. Though the official reasons for dispersal 
were beneficent, people questioned such projections of state benevolence. Many 
suspected ‘hidden agendas’ were at play: ‘It is true,’ the informal chef de site suggested, 
‘there is a government’s program to destroy the site…It is not only this site, if you heard 
[about] Mutaho, Ruhohoro. They are trying to destroy all the [IDP] sites and then invent 
unrealistic projects like here – an international airport. But we realized this was just a 
way to threaten us.’  ‘I don’t think there is any [development] project,’ a young girl, a 
supervisor in the local secondary school concluded, ‘It is just a political project, to take 
us out of here.’ ‘Some among the officials, some who will talk to you privately, they 
                                                        
32 Interview with the Social Advisor to the Makaba villagisation site, July 22, 2013. 
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would say “To be honest, we want you to leave because of the massacres, it is kind of a 
reminder, we want these massacres to be forgotten,” two young men told us. In people’s 
minds then, development served a number of purposes at once, being a threat to some, a 
promise to others. Political reasons of silencing the past were usefully married to 
political promises to CNDD-FDD supporters in the surrounding communities ahead of 
the 2015 elections.  
 
In Bugendana, the labor of the negative proceeds in a slightly different way from its 
typical understanding as ‘active not knowing’ of a violent past, the not-daring to state 
the obvious. The ‘law of silence’33 does not hold up in this space, which if anything is 
unique in the active presence of the past, voiced and marked, etched onto the landscape 
in the form of the memorial and regular commemoration. But Bugendana also shows 
that exposure is insufficient if it is not coupled with a public system of recognition and 
protection. We are reminded, as we are with all the different cases, that it is not the 
exposure of the secret that matters but the type of revelation that does justice to it.  The 
physical reminders at Bugendana are there but they are still lying in a space of precarity. 
The Bugendana inhabitants are vulnerable as they hold no titles to the land, the site is 
government-owned. It is this precarity, the real potentiality of delinkage and erasure, 
that shows where power lies, rather than the law of silence as Taussig would have it. It 
is not public secrecy, but public lack of a protective legal structure that creates the 
ability for the government to proceed ‘as if not.’ The clash of materialities – the 
undesirable and transient settlement pitched against the desirable and substantial 
infrastructural development – underlines the vulnerability not only of the site, the 
inhabitants and their cemetery, but the fragility of memory as it is threatened with 
physical decoupling from place through which it is remembered.34  
                                                        
33 Taussig, supra n 3 at 6. 
34 Filippucci ‘accords great centrality to the materiality of place, arguing that past violence is 
remembered in the places of violence because it is remembered through them.’ Quoted in: 
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b. Exposure Without Revelation, The Limbo of Remains Unearthed: Road 
Construction in Zone Kivyuka, Commune Musigati, Province Bubanza. 
 
Burundi’s landscape of memory does not reflect ‘a’ form of labor of the negative but 
many. The Kivyuka site provides here an interesting contrasting case to that of 
Bugendana. The settlement lies in the northern province of Bubanza and is a site of mass 
killing also dating back to the civil war. The mass graves here, however, have never been 
officially marked.  
 
On May 3, 1996, a vividly remembered massacre of (mostly) Hutu civilians was 
perpetrated by the army at the local marketplace. This was a Hutu rebel stronghold 
during the war and the massacre was a retaliation for rebels’ repeated destruction of 
electricity pylons in the area. It was a coffee season and a market day but the market 
remained empty precisely because of intimations of what might come. The local 
administrator took the megaphone and called the population to gather in the 
marketplace in order to deliver a ‘security message.’ After he retreated, the military 
surrounded the place, threw a grenade and opened fire on the gathering, killing 
approximately 350 people in the process.  
 
The perpetrators—the military—came back days after the massacre to remove the 
victims and place them into purpose-made mass graves nearby. They were not thorough 
in their work and some of the victims’ remained buried under the marketplace. The 
place fell into disuse but ‘long after, the administration persuaded the population to use 
                                                                                                                                                              
Nicolas Argenti and Katharina Schramm, Remembering Violence: Anthropological Perspectives on 
Intergenerational Transmission, (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books,2009), 25. 
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the same place as a market,’ citing lack of alternatives.35 The market of Kivyuka is then 
where the ordinary and extraordinary come to a transgressive interplay. In the context 
of an enforced silence on the past, a public secret was literally stepped right over, etched 
into space through the mundane re-use coupled with public silence. The public memory 
proceeded ‘as if not’ and demonstrated the sort of power Taussig spoke about (though 
no longer, as will be shown).  
 
The Kivyuka case poses a stark contrast to Bugendana. In Bugendana, both the people 
and the remains of victims of the massacre are facing displacement from a site that is 
suffused in memory to an extent unparalleled in Kivyuka. The Bugendana burial place is 
separated out and marked with a commemorative cross whereas Kivyuka’s victims were 
never accorded such recognition. But whereas Bugendana’s inhabitants live 
continuously with the fear and threat of displacement, it is in Kivyuka where remains 
were actually unearthed in the process of road construction.  
 
While the Kivyuka massacre also took place during the civil war in the 1990s, the  
constellation of actors was very different. The victims were principally Hutu and the 
perpetrators the former Tutsi-dominated government. The indiscriminate killing in the 
marketplace was a counter-insurgency tactic and a retributive act against the actions of 
the then-rebels and now dominant party CNDD-FDD. Today, the area lies in the 
stronghold of the CNDD-FDD party. People here spoke openly of supporting the 
government in the upcoming elections, and as opposed to the inhabitants of 
Bugendana— who spoke fearfully about the intentions of the President and his 
government— people here referred to Nkurunziza intimately as ‘President Peter.’  
 
                                                        
35 The market was recently relocated and ‘upgraded’ but remains in close vicinity of the old site. 
Interview with an employee at Kivyuka’s Secondary School, April 2015. 
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But this sort of positioning of the victims as the martyrs of the previous regime has not 
made post-war recognition any easier. Because of the dynamics highlighted in previous 
sections, public silence on the past has dominaned and defined the space of the Kivyuka 
massacre before the end of the civil war, but even after. In conformity with the findings 
of Cyrus Samii, Kivyuka actually lies in the zone of the strongest preference for silence 
on the past.36 As a local activist and relative of a massacre victim frustratingly admits, 
local people say ‘agapfuye kabazwa ivu, meaning “ask the earth about the dead”… they 
are done, finished.’ A woman farmer on the hill just above the market place confirmed 
this: ‘We consider that these things are gone, they have passed.’ Interestingly then, the 
Hutu victims of the deposed Tutsi-dominated government find it no easier to gain 
recognition of the crime, mark the site, or to commemorate under a regime that fought 
for their very political emancipation.  
 
‘Why is there such a resistance towards commemoration and unearthing of graves?’ I 
asked a local activist. ‘This is a land of mass graves…it becomes an embarrassing 
question for the government. [It sets a precedent:] If they do it for Kivyuka, voices will 
rise everywhere. This partially explains it. There is also bad faith, lack of will.’ The 
impunity alliance is certainly to blame. The top officials responsible are still in the 
government, and the CNDD-FDD party would risk undermining the careful power-
sharing accord if it chose partial justice. 
 
Impunity has certainly reigned over the events: ‘The local administrator who gave the 
message [in the market] is dead, but even then he was known as Ndakaravye [I washed 
my hands of this]. The captain who was the commander during the events is alive and 
has been promoted to colonel in the army. The commander of the army in the commune 
                                                        
36 Samii, supra n 2. 
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at the time is alive and in the army.’37 This reflects a much broader documented 
phenomenon whereby ‘members of former Burundian army (Forces Armées 
Burundaises) continue to hold positions of power.’38 
 
‘Nobody, no single authority came after [the massacre] to deliver a message [ijambo 
ryihumure—a message of hope, to say sorry],’ tells me Charles Mokoto, the then head of 
the local victims’ association. It was only ‘in 2010, during the electoral campaign that the 
President of the Senate came and emphasized that the government will unearth the 
remains and bury them with dignity. Nothing has happened since.’39  
 
The local Association de Victimes de Kivyuka was formed in 2010 as the first institutional 
vehicle to represent the victims and their families. The association was the first to raise 
concerns about road construction in the area, gathered names of victims, and attempted 
annual commemorations. The struggles of the association are telling in highlighting the 
political nature of commemoration, even in a political stronghold area. The association 
was refused national registration and could only register locally. In 2012, the 
administration refused permission for a mass to be held at the site. But a form of 
unofficial commemoration still took place40 and continues to do so annually.  
 
Kivyuka would likely be little known were it not for a powerful controversy related to 
post-war development and its direct threat to the gravesites. Namely, a brand-new 
Bubanza-Ndora road was projected to run through the middle of Kivyuka village, cutting 
through the gravesites. In 2011, facing pressure from the association, the company 
agreed to bypass the graves but works restarted in 2012. In 2013, human remains 
dating to the 1996 massacre were unearthed in the marketplace. A quick exhumation 
                                                        
37 Interview with Charles Mokoto, Bujumbura, July 2013. 
38 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Burundi: Seek Justice for War Crimes Victims’,2009. 
39 Interview with Charles Mokoto, supra n 48. 
40 Including the laying of flowers, three minutes of silence and a silent prayer. 
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ensued and partial remains of about six people were hastily wrapped up in holding 
banners and placed in eleven wooden boxes without care or ceremony. The exhumation 
was overseen by local administrators, without the presence, knowledge of or 
consultation with survivors or the police.   
 
When people in Kivyuka narrate the 1995 massacre, they paint a clear and detailed 
picture of many eyes set on the cover-up actions of the government— they vividly 
invoke the making of a public secret. What features prominently in their narratives is 
the image of the bulldozer and the truck (camion benne), a set of powerful machines 
coming from outside their community and bound on a technical task, representing the 
state’s systematic and out-in-the open task of mass management of materiality. Arriving 
days after the massacre, the bulldozers uncovered the bodies from the shallow graves in 
the marketplace and dumped them into two or three mass graves nearby where they 
have stayed ever since, with no official marker or trace. Heavy rains would at times 
resurface pieces of remains from their resting place. Horrific as the killing itself was, the 
manner of treatment added to the trauma.  
 
The direct implements— the machinery of violence— today re-emerges as machinery of 
development, but importantly one that doubles as machinery of a more subtle, symbolic 
violence as well (as in involved in attacks on memory and dignity, personal and group 
rather than physical integrity). The 2013 Kivyuka events were a parallel and a reversal 
of history at once. Foreign bulldozers and trucks were coming again from outside 
people’s community, but this time in the context of (at least official) peace and in the 
name of infrastructural development and integration. But what remained was the 
careless surfacing of the earth, now proceeding not in name of direct repression, but 
rather indirectly, in a context of a missing framework for safeguarding and protecting 
unearthed remains and memory more broadly.  
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Importantly, it is not so much the exposure of the remains (as in the unveiling of a public 
secret) that aroused local outrage but rather their undignified treatment (as in the type 
of revelation). The construction company Sogea-Satom allegedly wanted to dispose of 
the remains ‘along with the dust.’ The administrators proposed an alternative— to bury 
the remains in the local cemetery. The victims’ association protested. Those exhumed 
did not die natural deaths and this recognition needed to be inscribed into space, it 
required a spatial separation and demarcation. To the association, both options 
represented a continued labor of the negative, an erasure not of the remains’ 
materiality, but of their status and memory, them as proof and index to a ‘painful past.’41  
 
The (dis)placement of the remains mattered, just as it did in Kivyuka. Here too the labor 
of the negative was constituted through their misplacement and the resulting delinkage. 
But unlike in Bugendana, the delinkage in Kivyuka was not from a place through which 
the events were properly remembered. The struggle in a sense was an anterior one, it 
was ontological at heart as it concerned the very designation and demarcation of proper 
place where these remains should rest. Kivyuka saw repeated delinkage of its remains 
from an appropriate form and space of remembrance, first in form of mass graves 
during the civil war, and later in the form of either proposed disposal or relocation to an 
unmarked site after the war.  
 
In the end, the exhumed remains were salvaged for an uncertain future. They were 
placed apart and are currently stored at a local secondary school. There is no sign 
marking their presence. In a very symbolic gesture, only the local administrator (chef de 
zone) holds the keys to the room. The association’s ultimate objective is official 
                                                        
41 Iwacu, ‘Kivyuka, Bubanza: Exhumations en l’absence des families des victims,’ Iwacu, 
09/07/2013, http://fr.africatime.com/burundi/articles/kivyuka-bubanza-exhumations-en-
labsence-des-familles-des-victimes (accessed March 3,2016). 
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commemoration, dignified reburial, and importantly, preservation of the remains to 
serve as proof of past events. Nonetheless the status of the remains remains that of 
limbo. During my visit in 2015, two years after their exhumation, the coffins still 
remained locked with no plans for reburial or memorial construction. In my last 
communication with the local association in April 2016, there was no progress on the 
issue. With the massacres unaddressed and unacknowledged in the first place, this is for 
many a double erasure from history. 
 
In conclusion, the Kivyuka site presents a powerful show of the displacements of 
memory and removal of remains and the past in the name of development. A local 
activist admitted that ‘the road is necessary because the area is isolated.’42 Nonetheless, 
and in reference to the urgency of the road construction, the head of AMEPCI highlighted 
that development should not be done ‘by flouting the most basic rights.’ The families of 
victims felt profoundly disappointed with the act, which only produced mefiance 
(distrust) of the government. After all, the people buried here were ‘martyrs of the 
CNDD-FDD,’ the dominant party, dying in response to their actions during the civil war. 
Testimonies repeatedly highlight the exact phrase of the communal administrator 
Gratien Ruriryanino that unequivocally tied the gathered people to the fate of the rebels: 
‘Uwishinze inamujandi yajanye nawe’ (if you follow the renegade, you share their fate). 
Now, paradoxically, the same people are suffering further violence, symbolic violence 
from the very actors that were meant to symbolize change. After six years of activism in 
a government stronghold area, the unearthed Kivyuka remains rest unceremoniously 
behind locked doors without the slightest sign marking their presence. 
 
c. The Tragedy of Lesser Crimes: Urban Development on Hill Zege, city of Gitega. 
 
                                                        
42 Interview with Charles Mokoto, supra n 48. 
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The final short contrasting case is the hill Zege on the outskirts of Gitega in central 
Burundi. This is an example of a labor of the negative in the most literal sense as 
physical effacement of the past. In 2015, the hill was cleared for the construction of a 
brand new urban quarter. In the process of construction work, human remains of men, 
women and children were unearthed, but these were subsequently left lying on the 
cleared earth in open view. Zege was a mixed burial ground. During the civil war, the 
local population used the site as a cemetery but the government and the rebels also used 
to bury on the site, possibly commingling remains and histories of natural and unnatural 
death.  
 
The very blunt exposure of human remains during construction activated no protection 
measures and only very little media attention. The only action taken by the local 
administration was to, via the churches, invite people who have buried their relatives 
there to relocate them elsewhere. This privatised displacement of remains has proven 
all but unviable as most graves were unmarked, and people claimed that the relocation 
should be the task of the government.43 When the construction unearthed the remains in 
early 2015, there was no local organization present to mount protest and to protect the 
remains. The newly established Truth and Reconciliation Commission visited the area 
but failed to act. The whereabouts of the remains are unlikely to be properly established, 
the undignified removal reversed, and the truth of their past unlikely to be established.  
 
Hill Zege is be the story of many other minor sites of killing and un-indentified graves 
where labor of the negative proceeds without any special premeditation and without 
much resistance. It represents the frictionless happenstance of new build-up and 
infrastructure rewriting the landscape, performing its clearances and turning the past 
into disposable rubble. Just the previous year, in November 2014, construction around 
                                                        
43 Impunity Watch (IW), ‘Sincerity of Burundi’s Commitment to Transitional Justice under 
Scrutiny as TRC Commissioners Sworn In,’ Impunity Watch Policy Brief (December 2014) 
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the Bururi prison led to similar accidental unearthing, without any procedure for proper 
treatment, protection or reburial. It is also likely that the ‘lesser sites’ will escape the 
attention of an overwhelmed commission, if and when it commences its work.  
 
What Remains: Clearance and Displacement of Memory After the War  
 
What remains? This is a pertinent question—what are the material traces, the marks, 
the crosses, the maps and archives, the indications of past violence inscribed into 
Burundi’s post-war landscape? Where are the remains of five decades of political 
violence defined by disappearance, disposal in mass graves, and an enforced silence? 
What and where is the physical record able to ‘register memory for future 
accountability’?44  
 
Our case studies have brought this record to stark relief.  Burundi’s landscape is in fact 
‘replete with traces of violence, but these traces are largely hidden beneath the 
surface.’45 On April 30, 2014, Burundian civil society group AMEPCI-Gira Ubuntu 
announced to have identified almost 500 mass graves only of the 1972 victims.46 Yet a 
decade after the end of the war, there is still no official mapping of mass graves in 
Burundi. Mass gravesites are often unmarked and almost always highly politicized.47 
 
The continued lack of public recognition and protection of civilian sites of massacre in 
Burundi has important repercussions but as we have seen, it does not mean these sites 
have not been revisited, reconstituted, untended. Many have become part of everyday 
life as markets, toiled fields, courtyards or environs of public institutions. In some 
                                                        
44 Werbner, supra n 15 at 1. 
45 Vanderlick and Batungwanayo, supra n 22 at 4.  
46 http://burundi-agnews.org/genocide/burundi-genocide-1972-pres-de-500-fosses-communes-
identifiees/ (accessed on March 2,2016). 
47 Vanderlick and Batungwanayo, supra n 22 at 4 
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instances, local communities have erected memorials, organized informal 
commemoration and/or struggled for official recognition. The preceding sections 
offered a fine-grained look at such local-level action and struggle over the tracing and 
making of a mark over that which remains. 
 
Equally importantly, the case studies demonstrated the ways in which the labor of the 
negative has actually transformed and proceeded post-war. The indexes to the past that 
do exist in the landscape are being eroded in multiple and perhaps more insidious ways. 
Importantly, such labor is not always the result of a purposeful plan, but rather often the 
result of the lack of any protection or proper mapping mixed with political disincentives. 
These new, subtler dynamics are well expounded through the struggle between 
materialities—the threat posed to memory through the layering of build-up, whether 
accidental, purposeful, or merely intimated.  
 
‘Violence leaves traces,’ writes Schramm, but so does peace building and post-war 
reconstruction.48 Memory of violence is ‘inscribed onto space’ but so are efforts at post-
war integration, physical and social. The post-war space is thus where reminders of 
violence and objects of peace building and reconstruction intermesh, and at times clash. 
By focusing on interaction and layering, the study differs from literature focused 
squarely on violence’s traces or the affective states created by these.49 The focus lies 
instead on the physical and affective geography produced through layering materiality 
created during transition in the name of development and integration on the side or on 
top of materiality produced by war. As shown, new layers of materiality – 
redevelopment of urban neighborhoods, erection of large development projects, 
extension of road infrastructure— have been exacting their own compensations vis-à-
                                                        
48 Katharina Schramm, ‘Landscapes of Violence: Memory and Sacred Space (Introduction),’ 
History and Memory 23, 1 (2011):5. 
49 See Yael Navarro-Yashin, The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012); also Schramm, see supra n 42. 
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vis the past, threatening to displace or overwrite memory as embedded in the physical 
record.  
 
The clash of materialities demonstrates quite well the subtle labors of the negative that 
we see at play today. One of the broader techniques is ‘delinkage’— the displacement 
and disconnect of either commemoration activities or human remains from their spatial, 
symbolic and temporal referents. The requests to change dates of commemoration, 
names of organizations, or the resting place of victims’ remains (the focus here)— 
precisely the linkages that bear most meaning— act to erase the symbolic charge and 
present forms of symbolic violence. They downgrade memory from a meaningful form 
of revelation to (often literally) bare-bones exposure. 
 
Erasure, overwriting and misplacement of memory arising from redevelopment are 
perhaps the starkest manifestations of these new post-war dynamics. They demonstrate 
the careless and undignified removal of remains resulting from new material build-up 
coupled with lack of protection and recognition. But there is a longer history to this 
practice, and two strains of strategy emerge— purposeful erasure, and the inevitable 
overwriting due to lack of protections and provisions. Already during the 1972 
genocide, large infrastructure was layered atop mass graves: ‘To make disappear the 
proofs of the undertaking, some of these mass graves were used [became bases] for 
erecting public infrastructure such as was the case of Bujumbura international airport in 
the capital or the Institute of Agronomic and Zootechnical Research (IRAZ) in Gitega.’50 
Such purposeful material cover-up was accompanied by more indirect covers. Multiple 
smaller burial sites became claimed by agriculture. People came to toil atop graves. 
Today, the clash of material build-ups provides a disturbing parallel to the past, though 
it perhaps proceeds in more indirect ways.  
                                                        
50See:http://www.arib.info/Conference_internationale_genocide_1972_Communique_presse_09a
vril2014.pdf (accessed March 15, 2016). 
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The cases of Bugendana, Kivyuka and Zege analyzed above show the many faces of the 
subtle erasure of memory at play today. Yet despite differences, each case upholds the 
Benjaminian dictum on truth. It is not ultimately exposure that matters— and in each 
case we indeed see powerful exposures, whether in the form of actual material proof, 
the resurfacing of human remains of violence, or more indirect but no less powerful 
physical indexes and markers on the body and the landscape, or in the form of voice and 
resurgent memory. Instead, it is the type of revelation that is key. Indeed from the 
viewpoint of the local communities, it is the very nature of revelation and treatment of 
the resurfaced past that is a bone of contention and a source of grievance. Drawing on 
the rich texture of these examples, we can see how exposure without appropriate 
revelation can consolidate rather than undermine the labor of the negative, and can 
produce symbolic violence through its attack on dignity and its manufacture of denial. 
 
5. The 2014 Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Decisive Break with the 
Past? 
In 2014, we have witnessed what could be interpreted as a breakthrough in Burundi’s 
transitional justice process. On December 4, the Burundian parliament elected the 
eleven commissioners that would form the new Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC). But does the establishment of the TRC signal a decisive break with the past? Is it 
a sign that the dynamics we have reviewed above will be reversed? There are a number 
of reasons why we need to be cautious with our optimism. The TRC has been politicized 
and compromised since its inception, and the recent political crisis (April 2015-) has 
made any meaningful progress difficult. What we witness in Burundi is an ongoing and 
entrenched system of impunity buttressed by a lack of political will to deal with the past 
and the recent crisis-related abuses.   
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First, the TRC is perceived as an institution lacking independence and one over which 
the dominant party retains control.51 The mandate of the commission has been widely 
criticized by both domestic and external actors as it fails to reflect key preferences 
arising from the 2009 National Consultations on transitional justice.52 Second, the new 
TRC was installed just before a controversial election has plunged the country into an 
ongoing political crisis, in which the state is again implicated in a violent and repressive 
way. The Commission has officially been in its preparatory stage, but it appears 
stranded by the political deadlock, with little detectable activity..’ 
 
Third, the TRC mandate is expansive when compared to other Commissions such as 
those of Sierra Leone and South Africa.53 Among its objectives, the TRC sets out to 
‘identify and exhume all mass graves’ and is expected to ‘take measures to protect them 
and to allow for exhumations and reburials.’54 The immensity of the task coupled with 
the factors mentioned above makes this proposition unlikely. Instead, the Commission 
will likely have to be selective in its approach.55  
 
Last but not least, other continuities persist , and namely that unmarked mass graves 
are being produced again. The recent political crisis has created its own layers of 
grievance, killings and disappearance.56 There are reasons to believe that the existing 
system of impunity will be extended to cover these crimes through the application, yet 
                                                        
51 Impunity Watch, supra n 54 at 3. 
52 Such as the inclusion of civil society in the TRC and the mixed composition of the commission. 
Ibid. 
53 David Taylor, ‘Truth Under the Avocado Trees. Local Needs and Burundi’s TRC: Wither the 
Truth?,’ Journal of Eastern African Studies 7, 3 (2013):450-470. 
54 Vandeginste, supra n 13 at 362. 
55 Ibid., 363.  
56 It is estimated that over 400 people have been killed during the crisis, with ‘some 595 people 
ill-treated or tortured [in detention] since April 2015.’ See United Nations Human Rights, Office 
of the High Commissioner, ‘Torture and illegal detention on the rise in Burundi,’ April 18, 2016, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19835&LangID=E#s
thash.Rn7VaR5G.dpuf (accessed April 20,2016). 
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again, of immunité provisoire.57 These recent violations nonetheless fall outside the 
TRC’s mandate, which covers events between 1962-2008. A set of paradoxes thus 
unfolds. First, the recent events clearly show that the past the TRC aims to deal with is 
far from a past. And yet second, the recent events come to fully overshadow that long 
past.  
 
A quick google search on ‘exhumation of victims of violence in Burundi’ returns page 
after page of recent press coverage, revolving around events in and around Bujumbura 
on December 11, 2015 when more than 80 people were ‘systematically’ killed and 
disappeared in response to an attack on military installations in what became one of the 
most violent days of the ongoing crisis.58 In January 2016, Amnesty International has 
claimed evidence of mass graves in Buringa on the outskirts of Bujumbura, allegedly 
dating to the December 2015 crackdown.59 Satellite imagery and video recordings were 
used to buttress witness accounts and now populate the internet.60  
 
In all of this coverage nonetheless, there is not a single reference to a long past of 
violence and a landscape filled with gravesites. Yet the past literally repeats itself in the 
method and machinery of contemporary violence—disappearance and the truck. The 
hallmarks of the 1972 genocide re-emerge. Victim’s families are unable to trace, retrieve 
and bury their dead. Something else gets replayed in real time too— the practice of the 
public secret— knowing what not to know, signaling a return to a repressive treatment 
of political violence. We could thus argue that a new commemorative phase is being 
                                                        
57 Vandeginste supra n 5. 
58 For details see: Al Jazeera, ‘Burundi Accused of Systematic Killings in Capital,’ December 
22,2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/burundi-accused-systematic-killings-
capital-151222090152823.html (accessed January 14,2016). 
59 See Amnesty International (AI) ‘Burundi: Satellite Evidence Supports Witness Accounts of 
Mass Graves,’ January 28,2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/01/burundi-
satellite-evidence-supports-witness-accounts-of-mass-graves/ (accessed March 15,2016). 
60 The UN is investigating reports of nine other mass graves and two cemeteries where bodies of 
victims were allegedly buried. 
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forged, one eerily reminiscent of the second phase discussed above whereby all violence 
is carefully suppressed. The graves are not a mystery and witnesses exist but they do 
not speak out because ‘the policemen who were there that day intimidated them.’ ‘It is a 
secret between us and the commune [emphasis added],’ suggested one of the employees 
of the municipality.61 The world knows too and pays attention. Nonetheless, it does so 
without placing the latest disappeared into the larger historical context and without 
taking any meaningful action. This poses the pressing question of what sort of truth is 
indeed being built in the international public— one of exposure of the secret (even that 
being very partial) or a revelation that also does justice to a violent past? 
  
Conclusions  
By way of conclusion, what can we learn about public memory, commemoration and 
transitional justice more broadly from a case defined by decades of deadlock and 
inaction on the past? First, the paper presents a unique, bottom-up excavation of the 
ways in which ‘compromised transitions’ actually affect memory and shape the physical 
record of violence. It refocuses our attention on local level struggles and the interface 
between unofficial and official commemorative practice. This perspective pushes us 
away from a focus on ‘absences’ and ‘lack’ still dominant in the literature on both 
Burundi and other deadlocked transitions. In turn and second, such analysis opens to 
view labors of the negative e— forms of effacement of the past— that differ from both 
cases of outright memory suppression and state-sponsored official commemoration . As 
shown, in Burundi a repressive strategy has given way to a proliferation of more varied 
and subtler labors of the negative after the war. Nonetheless the overall effect is 
consistent, the epochs though different mutually reinforce erasure of memory in a 
multiplicity of forms. 
 
                                                        
61 See: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151230-burundi-temoins-existence-fosses-communes-
presumees-attaques-casernes (accessed March 14,1016). 
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The case of Burundi also urges us to reconsider the links between public secrecy, silence 
and power. Taussig has invited us to look beyond forms of knowledge at forms of active 
not-knowing, which can be equally productive of power. Yet the cases studied here show 
us powerfully a different sort of labor of the negative at play— one proceeding not only 
through public secrets and active silences, but at times despite voice and despite a most 
stark exposure of the secret in the form of unearthed remains. The ability to proceed as 
if not, to negate the past, might no longer be the product of active suppression but rather 
the weight of absence, the lack of protection and procedure reflective of the broader lack 
of political will. In Burundi it is the real potentiality of delinkage and erasure of memory 
that shows where power lies, not the law of silence. The clash of materialities—those of 
memory and development—reveals this dynamic most clearly. 
 
At the three different sites that we have overviewed, the inhabitants are unequivocal in 
arguing that what matters is the form of the material trace etched into public 
recognition. Physical exposure is not enough, it is the manner of revelation that alone 
can restore power and voice to the victims and their relations. What remains matters— 
it is present, it is known, and at times it is even unearthed and exposed— and yet it still 
remains to be revealed. For actors such as the TRC, this means that fact-finding must be 
coupled with a system of designation, protection and commemoration. Importantly, 
exposure without revelation is not simply ineffective or insufficient, it serves to produce 
and reproduce symbolic violence through the delinkage, displacement and 
mistreatment, and effacement of memory that accompany it. The future of Burundi’s 
sites of violence is highly uncertain, compounded both by the political crisis and the 
nature of the Commission set up to protect them. 
 
What can interpretive work through public secrecy and materialities teach us about 
post-war memory more broadly, in other divided societies and deadlocked transitional 
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processes? The paper expands our understanding of how memory and power interlock. 
It reaches beyond manufacture of official memory (forms of knowledge) and 
suppression witnessed through the public secret (‘negative knowledge’) to show that 
erasure of memory works through mechanisms of delinkage, displacement and disposal 
(despite or alongside knowledge). The materiality of memory tells this story most 
clearly and needs to be employed in settings not only where transitional justice stalls 
such as Burundi or is absent such as CAR, but also where it is present but one-sided such 
as in Rwanda. What happens to unmarked mass graves and unofficial commemorations 
in these spaces? It is only if we understand the full repertoire of labors of the negative in 
each case that we can start effectively counter-acting them. This paper has been an 
attempt to expand our understanding of such a repertoire, and hopefully further work 
will extend the analysis presented here. 
